


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21 August 1964



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
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Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800400001-1

25X1

21 August 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

3. Congo (Brazzaville): Possibility Western embassies may be attacked increasing. (Page 5)
4. South Vietnam: Opposition to reorganization of government developing and may become serious. (Page 6)

25X1

7. British Guiana: Jagan shifting his tactics on elections this fall. (Page 10)
8. Notes: North Vietnam; [REDACTED] Dominican Republic. (Page 11)

25X1

25X1

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800400001-1

25X1

Congo (Brazzaville): The US and other Western embassies in Brazzaville are likely to be attacked if relations between Brazzaville and Leopoldville deteriorate further.

*On 19 August, Premier Tshombé began to carry out a recent decision to expel some 30,000 Congo (Brazzaville) citizens now in Leopoldville. Tshombé believes that activities supported by Brazzaville are the root of his troubles.

According to the Belgian Embassy in Brazzaville, an anti-US official of the regime there stated on 19 August that the Congolese would attack the US, British, and Belgian embassies if Leopoldville goes through with the expulsion. The official claimed that his government was already having great difficulty in preventing youth groups from attempting to sack the embassies.

Also on 19 August, the Brazzaville foreign minister repeated to the US ambassador his previous declaration that his government would hold countries supporting Tshombé responsible for any Leopoldville "aggression" and that the US would "head the list." He intimated that Brazzaville would seek Communist support in such an eventuality.

25X1

21 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

5

South Vietnam: Opposition to the recent reorganization of the Khanh government is developing and may become serious.

Both principal Buddhist leaders, moderate Thich Tam Chau and militant Thich Tri Quang, have expressed apprehension over the changes. Large Buddhist demonstrations in Saigon, Hué, and other towns yesterday commemorating the anniversary of the Diem regime's pagoda raids were probably intended to warn Khanh of the danger of reverting to repressive practices. Chau publicly criticized Khanh at the Saigon rally.

Quang told the US Embassy that Buddhist grievances stem in part from the displacement of General Minh, who is identified with Diem's overthrow, while military officers associated with the Diem regime are given positions of authority. Quang also claimed that the government has not adequately punished local officials in central Vietnam, where persecution of Buddhists allegedly has continued, and that Saigon is planning to remove officers favored by the Buddhists in the northern provinces.

Both Buddhist leaders in effect denied any collusion with the student groups in Hué and Saigon who have been protesting the authoritarian character of the new constitution. Students have become a growing political force of their own since last year's Buddhist campaign against Diem, but they may also be subject to manipulation by the Buddhist leadership or by political rivals of Khanh. The students have threatened further demonstrations, and police action against them could lead to an immediate intensification of tensions.

(continued)

21 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

6

[Some leading politicians in the old Khanh cabinet are voicing cautious support for the reorganization, probably in hopes of remaining in the new government. Ministers close to the Buddhists and to labor, however, are reported unlikely to stay on even if asked. The fact that some militant leaders in the Vietnamese Catholic community are indicating strong support for the reorganization seems likely to stimulate Buddhist opposition.]

25X1

21 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

7

25X1

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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British Guiana: [Jagan and the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) have apparently decided to cease their efforts to prevent elections this fall.]

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[] Jagan has, however, decided to contest the election, which the British plan to conduct on the proportional representation principle.]

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[] the PPP may tone down its pro-Communist, anti-US line. The party has information that concern about Communism has developed among the East Indian community where the party's strength lies.]

[The PPP may, however, continue harassing tactics, and intimidation of the opposition apparently is to remain standard procedure. Because of pressure from the PPP, two executives of the new Justice Party, which was launched on 9 August to attract voters dissatisfied with Jagan, have severed their association with the party.]

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NOTES

North Vietnam: Civil defense preparations have been accelerated in the wake of the US air strike.

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Antiaircraft defenses in the Hanoi area reportedly have been strengthened by the emplacement of additional gun batteries.

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*Dominican Republic: A general strike protesting the Dominican triumvirate's new austerity and exchange stabilization program appears to be spreading. The Social Christian Labor Confederation (CASC), which is fomenting the strike, is being actively supported by the illegal pro-Castro 14th of June Movement (APCJ). The government has declared the strike illegal, and labor agitators are being arrested. The triumvirate is expected to survive the crisis because it has the support of the armed forces.

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25X1

21 Aug 64

DAILY BRIEF

11

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

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